There is a pompous humility that I deplore in others, which I am about to represent as a virtue in myself. One who is not well up in a field is apt to harp on the very elementary aspects; and such is our conceit, that we hope that such topics are not merely elementary, but also elemental. Just so, the demi monde of mathematics uses florid formulas, but the pure mathematician wonders about obvious things: what "greater than" may mean, or whether a sheet of paper has two surfaces.
The Problem
The fundamental problem in the whole system of monitoring for genetic effects in populations seems to me to reside in two features: first, the data are more or less binomial in type-that is, they deal with individuals that either have, or have not, some particular characteristic; and secondly, the probability of a successful search, that is, of finding an aberrant case, is very small, perhaps one chance in a million or some small multiple thereof. If December 1981 increases in these rates that are due neither to defective sampling nor to the vagaries of chance, well and good: we are equipped to do battle over preventive measures. But failing to detect such changes, we can reassure, or be reassured, only if our tests have had high enough power. Now in this context, power means large samples, and large samples mean trouble. For either we must be dealing with an abnormality so conspicuous that the evidence is straightforward and recognition of all cases assured-stillbirths, sex ratios, multiple births-measures which will certainly have been exploited; or we must have an expensive system of vigilation and endless agonizing over the excellence and uniformity of diagnostic standards. Such an enterprise is cumbersome, and there must be at least systematic doubts as to whether it will work at all. Unfortunately, a cogent system of validation will, like belling the cat, surely prove at least as cumbersome as the main enquiry.
My misgivings will no doubt be obvious: that even with an enormous budget, methods demanding massive samples will not work. If, then, we are not to go this way, we are driven back on attacking our two fundamental problems: binomiality and low spontaneous rates.
Binomiality
Who uses the binomial distribution and why? The binomial is the simplest of all, nontrivial, 127 nondegenerate, distributions. If an event had fewer than two possible, distinct, outcomes, it could not be random. Now dichotomies of the binomial kind are imputed in two contexts: penetrating fundamentality and crass, even fatuous, naivity. Examples of fundamental binomiality would be existence and nonexistence, or matter and antimatter, or positive and negative electrical charges. Examples of crass binomiality would be "Americans" and "non-Americans"; or, in the tradition of Sellar and Yeatman (1), "good kings" and "bad kings." The essential difference is this: fundamental binomiality deals with something so near to the limit of our conceptual resolving power, that we are at a loss to find a constituent that will furnish any more basic term of discourse. There are not, for instance, degrees of existence. If something does not, and cannot, exist it is not an object of science. The gap between existence and its contrary is so enormous, that all other features assume trivial proportions. In such cases, we binomialize because we cannot escape doing so. It is arguable that the ultimate realities are dichotomous. This topic is the field of the fundamental scientist's fundamental scientist, the pure mathematician, the philosopher.
Crass binomiality is a less awesome phenomenon, in which the gap between the two states is much less wide, and may even be purely constructive. The difference between male and female, so the activists tell us, is largely fictive; and while sober scientists may not altogether corroborate this view, nevertheless we have no criterion of sex to which we can appeal for distinguishing unambiguously in disputed cases. The difference between "black" and "white" persons may conceivably have sociological meaning, but-in the United States at least-scarcely any biological merit whatsoever. For, insofar as race is a colorimetric term it is obvious, without any further formal documentation (2) , that color behaves as virtually an uninterrupted variable* and not a dichotomous one; and if race is a matter of genes, as is usually implied, studies on genetic admixture have repeatedly shown the shallowness of the dichotomy (3) (4) (5) ). Yet race is still widely used as a crass binomial character. Crass binomiality is, like as not, a product of ambition, distraction, uglification and derision; it pays scant heed to detail, to logical structure; it is, as we have seen, a kind of dead end of statistical power. It is the tool of the lazy; of the superficial; and of the logically timorous, who do not wish to venture any surmise that may prove false.
*Such a variable is often inaccurately termed "continuous."
You will notice that I have crassly binomialized binomiality itself. In fact, I am quite sure that there is an uninterrupted ontological scale from the fundamental to the crass (Table 1) . Rating on the scale of fundamentality-crassness depends on three features: natural grouping, reproducibility of the grouping, and the extent to which there exist more worthwhile and efficient means of assessment. So, to return at last to my topic, we might wonder where on this scale case-monitoring for new genetic mutations lies. My own belief is that it is towards the crass end of the continuum. Let me try to marshall my arguments.
In the first place, we must have doubts whether, even at a crass level, binomialization rather than polytomization, is an adequate description. The more we look, the more evidence we find of genetic heterogeneity. Consider, for instance, the alarming rate at which McKusick's (6), Borgaonkars (7) , and other catalogs are growing; the evidence of Harris (8) , and Boyer (9) on the ubiquity of chemical polymorphisms, mostly (so far) of structure and enzymic function; the horrendous diversity of tissue types (10) . More and more it grows on us that not two, but multiple, alleles per locus may be the rule. Figure how much mutation there must be, and watch the anxious frowns on the faces of the population geneticists trying to reconcile this profusion with classical theories of genetic load. Then recall that we are crassly dividing our observations into those with, and those without, harmful mutations (which, I suppose, wear white hats and black hats, respectively). Now, to be sure, if we are to make our inferences from coarse studies on populations-coarse not from choice but for logistical reasons-why, we can probably do little better. Or again, if our sole interest is the assessment of the scale of damage, the binomial method may do well enough. But this approach is to ignore mechanisms and how we may use them to refine our means of inference. At least one should seriously consider Where there is reason to suppose that this assumption is violated, the practice is to retreat into a subpopulation, for which independence does seem a warranted assumption, e.g., within a social class, or an occupation, or a family; and so successively. But there are logical weaknesses in this kind of successively conditioned inference.
Crass binomialization may be seen as a nonparDecember 1981 ametric analysis; but even in this "safe" and conservative field one can do better. Techniques such as the theory of runs have been devised to test for serial independence. One of the basic concerns where outcomes are not independent, is what the nature of the contagion may be. In genetics, we would think, for instance, of birth order. Thus, later members of a sibship are more likely to be affected by achondroplasia (because of paternal age); by Down's syndrome (because of maternal age); by Rh incompatibility (because of cumulative risk of sensitization); and by birth injury (because of multiparity and the risk of precipitate birth). But in congenital syphilis, clustering tends to occur in early pregnancies. Clustering in middle pregnancies may be due to domicile (during an intennediate stage of parental prosperity) in an area with a high level of some teratogen. But none of these highly informative patterns would show up in a crass binomial analysis, in which the number of affected progeny was regarded as sufficient (i.e., an adequately summarizing) statistic.
A natural extension of birth order (which is an ordering in a discrete, univariate, space) is ordering in multiple dimensions. But the foremost of these, clustering of residence or place of birth, is a much more complicated topic for two reasons. First, it is surprisingly difficult to give an adequate definition of what we mean by a cluster. The politically unscrupulous, like all wicked people, have a practical cunning for drawing boundaries in such a way as to manipulate the outcomes of elections. And precisely the difficulty of proving the gerrymander, is the lack of a sufficiently general theory of clustering against which the charge can be judged. Granted that we can draw closed loops, what are reasonable constraints on the shapes for these loops? Under the null hypothesis of uniform risk, provided that the loops are drawn beforehand, it does not matter what shapes they are. But for an unspecified alternate hypothesis where the loops are decided from the outcomes, interpretation is more difficult. There is a respectable theory of clustering (11); but I suppose that we have at least as much interest in interpreting the pattern as we have in merely rejecting the null hypothesis. Besides, the constitution of the alternate hypothesis (as is well known) determines where the rejection region lies. The null hypothesis might be rejected either because the occurrence of cases is too regular or too clumped. If, regardless of ali etiological factors, precisely every hundredth child had a particular congenital defect, the hypothesis of uniform risk would be implausible. Yet the hypothesis of clustering would be 129 even more implausible. We must recognize the diversity of etiologies: for the unifying thread might be a toxin distributed down a river valley; or pollutant in the lee of a factory; or radiation to houses built on a particular hill; or the flow of traffic.
The other problem of clustering is the variation in the density of the population. Under the null hypothesis of uniform risk, it is clear that (other things being equal) the expectation of the number of cases will be proportional to the size of the population in the area. Even if extreme cold or dryness are factors, one can hardly expect much of a cluster at the north pole or the more desolate parts of the Sahara Desert. If an acceptible map of Canada by a projection that conserves area (Fig.  la) were used to plot cases, clusters of almost anything whatsoever, (even social isolation!) will tend to occur in the big towns and, in the Western Provinces, at the most southerly parts, which is where the population is concentrated. But a rescaling to represent a uniform population density would allow genuine clusters to show up much more clearly. The map (Fig. lb) inspired by that of Skoda and Robertson (12) but much simplified, could be made ever more refined in detail, so that all districts of all cities could be individually identified. Of course maps could be devised, all of which give uniform population densities, which are topologically equivalent, but yield different shapes. We could devise several forms, each designed to detect certain patterns. For instance, in Figure 2A is represented an imaginary terrain in which contour lines are shown with a superimposed grid. A river is flowing northwards, its descent being steepest, and therefore its flow fastest, in the sourthern, more mountainous part of its course. In Figure 2B , the repatterned map takes account of westerly wind, which is strongest in the northern plains and weakest in the protection of the hills. The scale is thus contracted from west to east in the northern part. (The wind has the effect of scattering and hence "diluting" the concentration of cases, which must be regathered by crowding the scale.) In Figure 2C we suppose that the effects are waterborne, and hence there is greatest scattering where flow is fastest, just as a dye in a stream will be dispersed faster and further down, than across, the stream. Thus the southern part of the river must be foreshortened; and where density of population for the grid is to be conserved, the lateral scale must be stretched. These two distorsions are merely illustrations. Remembering that my topic is genetic effects, we might capitalize on the fact that human populations tend to 
Further Increasing the Power
Granted that we have extorted from the data all the refinement and the ancillary information that the nonrandomness of the cases may furnish, and granted that there is a practical limit to the size of the sample we may hope for, what more can we do to increase the power? I can think of three devices.
Increase the Sensitivity
We have already considered how we may do this by switching the focus from gross and disabling phenotypes to equivalent random changes of any kind. The argument here is that the sensitive index is rate of mutation, not rate of disease. In this approach, one would be substituting genetic skill of the few specialists for the unpolarized watchfulness of the many generalists. The burgeoning field of analysis of nucleic acids by restriction enzymes offers enormous promise. But we note three practical problems that it generates. The investigative tool is at present technically complex and may always be so. It remains to be seen whether it will ever be accessible to, say, the field epidemiologist. Secondly, to capitalize on power, we will need to study parents and children, since mutation is cogently established by demonstrating genetic content -in genes or chromosomes-of the offspring that cannot have been inherited. I need hardly point out the problems arising from doubtful parentage, especially paternity. We usually check for this contamination by genetic compatibility of marker genes. But there is a logical trap; for of course we have to decide how much of any incompatibility may be ascribed to new mutation, and when we should abandon this explanation in favor of nonparentage (15) . An obvious device is to exploit the difference between the degrees of uncertainty about nonpaternity and nonmaternity. (Of course one cannot ignore the inescapable confounding of any such effect with biological differences due to the sex of the disputed parent or to the special impact of the intrauterine milieu.) As we have noted, new mutation appears to increase with paternal age. (However, does nonpaternity also increase with the husband's age?). One may console oneself with the tRecently the proceedings of a workshop on cartography and epidemiology held in 1976, have been published (14) . None (This mapping, one of many possible mappings that are topologically and demographically equivalent, makes the density of the population uniform.) Hence, under the null hypothesis, that cases occur entirely at random, independently, and at constant risk, their distribution should follow Roach's probability algebra (11) . Systematic departures from this algebra-due to heterogeneity of risk ("hot spots"), to nonindependence ("contagion"), or to channels of spread (wind, water, food distribution, etc.) will produce typical patterns of distortion. For any given size of sample, the variance of the estimate increases as the proportion affected increases from 0% to 50%. Thus the implication of (say) a 10% difference in the proportions of affected subjects in two samples is least impressive where the trait is common ( Table 2 ). However, paradoxically the maximum possible power of a test for effect may be enhanced by increasing the larger proportion of positives ( The second procedure, then, is experimentation 
Strategic Withdrawal from Crass Binomiality
So I am led to suggest that we try our best to break free from binomialization of our data, at least to the point at which the level of resolution is much greater than that with which we are too often content. There are several methods of doing so.
First, and by far the most important, whatever we can do to impart structure to our crass binomial model, we should do with enthusiasm. To say how this task is to be done would be to propose a blueprint for most of modern biology. Even the most Olympian ambitions of a later speaker would not aspire to such a goal. But at the least perhaps I can give a few illustrations of the kind of thing I mean. December 1981
In our monitoring system we register each person affected by cancer as a single event; and that is probably the best we can do on the evidence. But if we are in a position to impart structure to this binomialized outcome, we can do better. Suppose, for instance, that we accept the NordlingArmitage (7, 8) model that cancer is a multiple-hit process. Then, rather tritely, it is produced by multiple events which, ideally, could be individually counted. If we have, and seize, the opportunity to identify intermediate stages, we may do much better than by simply counting cancers. For instance, it is widely held (19) that bowel cancer occurs only in an antecedent polyp. If it takes one hit to convert normal bowel into a polyp, and a second hit to convert the polyp into a cancer, then we have two events to be scored, not one. The casual observations of my colleagues in gastroenterology are that polyps are perhaps an order of magnitude more prevalent than cancers. Hence we have, on this hypothesis, at least two events we can score, and at present, most epidemiologists are scoring cancers only, the less common of the two. But even that is not all. For estimates (20, 21) have suggested that common cancers may be something like a seven-hit process; and one supposes that, in principle, the several intermediate stages differ and that each transition may be scored as an event. Of course, I am not putting all this up as a finished product, or even as one that I believe literally. The point is that if we succeed in getting "inside" the process, we may break through the binomial barrier into something that is statistically much more efficient.
But even within the individual patient there may quite possibly be much more information than we have tapped. A burning issue at present is whether multiple polyposis of the colon (a disease in which we ourselves have a special interest) is monoclonal or polyclonal. If, as is plausible, it proves to be polyclonal, then each polyp is a separate event. Accordingly, we should not merely record whether or not the patient is affected, but how many polyps are present. The demonstration of polyclonal origin depends on having a marker that will Lyonize (22) . The only one widely useful at present is glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase (G6PD) for which there are many readily distinguishable alleles. No report on the findings for a suitable carrier has yet been published.
An admirable example of the use of the internal structure of the model and one on much more secure footing than bowel cancer (being much more readily accessible to study) is retinoblastoma. This tumor used to be called an autosomal dominant condition with incomplete penetrance (23) . This more likely than others; that there is degeneracy in the code; that where amino acids are concerned, a substitution of serine for proline requires that at least one event has occurred, of valine for argenine, at least two, and lysine for phenylalanine, at least three. They should be scored accordingly. As a concrete example, in Table 3 are given several descriptor that owes little allegiance to formal analysis, and none whatsoever to concrete biology. The way the term has been used by the insouciant is almost a parody of meaningless pseudo-parameterization. Needless to say, any effort to estimate it has, for the most part, been crassly binomial. Knudson (26, 27) ingeniously converted the phenomenon of retinoblastoma into a two-hit process which led to explicit predictions about recurrence risk in relatives of various types, in twins, in unilateral and bilateral cases, etc., which could be verified, and were. Now this model had two tremendous advantages. It identified a population at high risk; and that, as we have seen, may enhance power vastly. Even Pathology abounds in graded systems, devised for prognosis or to assess therapy, but with which the etiologist does nothing and, in the absence of any pathogenetic theory, can do nothing. The dermatologists, who of all physicians have the most accessible of systems to study, must surely see the skin as an admirable means for monitoring mutagenic insults. They talk about skin cancers with a malignancy of grade 1/2; but surely there must be some information waiting to be quarried out of the difference between such lesions and more malignant ones? Yet once again, there must presumably be more information to be extracted from the number of lesions there are and where exactly they occur. There must also be added insight from the (statistical) regression of the number of lesions on the extent of exposure (see below). Of course, one gets nothing for nothing; and to extract the information efficiently one needs to have some grasp of the structure of the process, and must be prepared to take some judicious, intellectual, risks by making surmises that one is spared in using the crass To the environmentalist, a mutation is a mutation is a mutation. But, for instance, we now know a great deal about point mutation-that is, mutaEnvironmental Health Perspectives 134 tion due to substitution of one nucleotide for another. We know that some substitutions are much term was given no precise meaning. "Penetrance" has been widely invoked without any attempt to define its logical properties (24) or without even any recognition of the fact that whether or not it has a heritable component makes a fundamental difference to its pattern of manifestation (25 
Conclusion
There is still insufficient recognition, even among professional epidemiologists, that to binomialize is the refuge of the destitute, a statistical device to be avoided at all costs. The basic problem is that it makes the data two-valued and that in consequence an absolute upper limit on what we can extract from the data, is set by the sample size. From a binomial test, one can never reject a null hypothesis of p = 1/2 at the 5% level from a sample of size 4 . no matter how grossly false the hypothesis. This limitation does not apply to the z, t, or F distributions, for instance. There is never any excuse in serious epidemiology for splitting continuous, unimodal, distributions into categories; but more, there should be an unceasing drive to convert what appear to be ineluctably binomial data into data with biological meaning, logical structure, epidemiological import, and statistical power. Until this policy is tried, or shown to be not merely troublesome but impossible, I have no tears to shed for our misfortunes.
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